contrast, K. Rothermund and D. Wentura (2004) proposed that IAT performance is dominated by salience asymmetries of the IAT's pairs of contrasted categories. To assess relative contributions of nominal feature contrasts vs. salience asymmetries we (a) briefly summarize the extensive evidence now available to support construct validity of the IAT as a measure based on nominal category features and (b) present two new experiments that yielded results problematic for the salience asymmetry interpretation. September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -3-
Validity of the Salience Asymmetry Interpretation of the IAT:
Comment on Rothermund and Wentura (2004) Rothermund and Wentura (2004; R&W hereafter) presented multiple experiments to support their conclusion that the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998;  GM&S hereafter) is strongly influenced by salience asymmetries of the categories used in IAT measures.
1 R&W introduced their salience asymmetry hypothesis as follows:
"Assume for a moment that the two categories of both the target and the attribute dimension indeed differ in salience. . . . In this case, participants will find it easier to respond if the salient categories of both dimensions (the "figures") are mapped onto one response and the non-salient categories (the "background") are mapped onto the other response" (R&W, p. 140).
Overview
We agree with R&W that salience asymmetries have the potential to contribute to IAT effects, much as do any other features that afford a basis for distinguishing among categories.
We nevertheless disagree with R&W about the importance of salience asymmetries relative to variations in the nominal features that distinguish categories used in the IAT. Nominal features are ones indicated by the names commonly used to identify categories. To give a few examples: age is the nominal feature when the category contrast is young vs. old; gender is the nominal feature when the contrast is male vs. female; and valence is the nominal feature when the contrast is pleasant vs. unpleasant. For these contrasts and others, R&W proposed that asymmetries in salience may be more significant contributors to IAT measures than are variations in the nominal features of the contrasted categories. In this comment we consider the possibilities for distinguishing the nominal feature and salience asymmetry interpretations and present some relevant data.
In preparing this comment, we discovered that what initially appeared to be our strongest disagreement with R&W was inconsequential. Correspondence with Klaus Rothermund September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -4-(personal communication, May 5, 2004) established that R&W had assumed a definition of association different from the one assumed by GM&S. This was not initially apparent because neither GM&S nor R&W had explicitly stated a definition of association. As will be seen, the different conceptions of association allowed (a) GM&S to declare that the IAT measured association strengths, (b) R&W to declare that the IAT did not measure association strengths, and (c) these two assertions not to involve an empirical disagreement.
We start by describing the different conceptions of association used by GM&S and R&W.
This allows us to observe that the disagreement between GM&S and R&W is confined to determining the relative contributions of salience asymmetries and nominal category features to IAT measures. To anticipate our conclusion: Although we agree with R&W that salience asymmetries have the potential to influence IAT performance, it remains for further research to establish that this possible influence threatens uses of the IAT to provide implicit measures of constructs in the domains of attitudes, stereotypes, self-concepts, and self-esteem.
Theory-uncommitted and Theory-committed Conceptions of Association
Association has a long history in psychology, including a wide variety of theory-based conceptions derived from the learning theories of Thorndike, Pavlov, Hull, and Tolman, among others (for overviews, see learning theory texts such as that of Bower & Hilgard, 1981) . Before the 20th century, the topic of association of ideas had a very long history in philosophy. Among the prior philosophical conceptions of the association of ideas are (a) Aristotle's (ca. 350 B.C./1930) view that there are four bases for association: contiguity, frequency, similarity, and contrast, and (b) David Hume's (1740 Hume's ( /1939 view that the bases for association can be reduced to three principles: resemblance (i.e., similarity), contiguity in time or place, and causality (effect associated with its cause). Many other philosophers, as well as many psychologists, have endorsed similarly broad conceptions of association, which are not tied to any specific theory of the structure of associative mental representations. This widely used theory-uncommitted conception of association was the one implicitly used in the GM&S article that introduced the September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -5-
IAT.
Like GM&S, R&W also provided no explicit definition of association. However, correspondence with Klaus Rothermund (personal communication, May 5, 2004) established that R&W assumed a conception based on modern theories of semantic networks (e.g., Quillian, 1967) and spreading semantic activation (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975) . As will be explained in the next few paragraphs, identification of this difference -between GM&S's theory-uncommitted conception and R&W's theory-committed conception -removes much of the apparent disagreement between their respective interpretations of the IAT.
A critical passage in R&W appears in their section, "Pitting the Two Accounts Against Each
Other" (p. 158). In that passage R&W described a strategic recoding interpretation of the IAT in which they used as an illustration the face-name thought experiment that was used by GM&S (p. 1464) to introduce the IAT. In the face-name example one task combination (male names and male faces getting one response; female names and female faces getting the other) makes it easy to use a shared feature (gender) to group the two categories assigned to each response.
The other task combination (male names and female faces getting one response; female names and male faces getting the other) provides no shared feature that can be used to simplify the task. Because R&W's semantic-network conception of association did not include similarity due to shared features as a basis for association, they did not consider GM&S's face-name example to involve a role of associations in IAT performance. In contrast, GM&S -regarding similarity due to the shared gender feature as a valid basis for association in their theoryuncommitted conception -understood their thought experiment as being consistent with an associative basis for IAT performance.
Although GM&S used no theory of the structure of associative mental representations in presenting their interpretation of the IAT as a measure of association strengths, it is nevertheless possible to explain the IAT with a theory-committed interpretation of association.
That was done recently in this journal by Hall, Mitchell, Graham, and Lavis (2003) , who based September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -6-their interpretation of the IAT on the theory of acquired equivalence (Dollard & Miller, 1950, p. 101). The theory of acquired (or learned) equivalence is that pairs of stimuli that have a common associate (e.g., faces and names both associated with specific genders) become associated to each other.
In summary, what appeared to be a central disagreement in interpretation of the IAT between GM&S and R&W proved to be no more than different preferences for defining the concept of association. This definitional disagreement has implications for choice of language to describe results that are expected to occur in similar empirical form by both GM&S and R&W.
Although the definitional disagreement can therefore be set aside for the remainder of this article, we can recommend to ourselves and to others that discussions of associative interpretations of the IAT should hereafter be explicit about their assumed conceptions of association.
Disagreements That Have Empirical Implications
When we go beyond the definitional disagreement that has just been set aside as non- The accumulated evidence for validity of the salience asymmetry interpretation is at present modest. One desirable respect in which R&W's evidence could be extended is through the development of multiple additional measures of salience asymmetry, to supplement the one that they developed and reported. We report some data below using additional salience asymmetry measures that we developed as variations of the one reported by R&W.
A second respect in which R&W's evidence could usefully be extended is to incorporate procedures more closely resembling the procedures of the published studies on which the main evidence for construct validity of the IAT rests. In their experiments, R&W extensively used two procedures that had previously been described as creating threats to the construct validity of September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -10-IAT measures: First, in five of their nine IAT experiments, R&W used non-categories (nonsense strings, unrelated neutral words, unknown names) in place of one category of a contrasted pair.
On the basis of their review, Greenwald and Nosek (2001) concluded that the IAT does not function properly when non-categories are used in this fashion. Second, R&W used millisecond-unit IAT measures rather than using either the log-transformed latency measure used in most of the existing published IAT literature or the improved D measure introduced by Greenwald et al. (2003) . Proneness of the millisecond-unit measure to cognitive skill artifact was demonstrated by Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, and McFarland (in press), Greenwald et al. (2003) , and Mierke and Klauer (2003) . The two new experiments reported here avoided these problematic procedures.
Additional Evidence Concerning Construct Validity of the Salience Asymmetry Interpretation: Two New Experiments
In order to add to the available evidence on construct validity of R&W's salience asymmetry account of the IAT, we conducted two new experiments that are described briefly here.
Experiment 1: No Effect of a Strong Salience Asymmetry Manipulation
This experiment applied a salience manipulation to an IAT closely modeled after one of the two IATs used in GM&S's Experiment 1. The target concept contrast was flowers vs. insects and the attribute contrast was pleasant vs. unpleasant valence. This IAT reliably produces an effect that GM&S interpreted as showing a stronger association of flowers (than insects) with positive valence. R&W should interpret this IAT either in terms of (a) an effect of salience asymmetries -assuming that insect items are more salient than flower items and that unpleasant items are more salient than pleasant items, or (b) a strategic recoding of the two contrasts (of the type described on p. 158 of their article) due to the subject using shared valence features to improve performance when the flower and pleasant categories are assigned to one key (with insect and unpleasant to the other). As previously noted, the latter interpretation is empirically equivalent to GM&S's association-strength interpretation, albeit with September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -11-different language. Experiment 1's plan was to overpower any natural salience asymmetry between the flower and insect categories by presenting items for one of these two categories in a bright red font, with all items for the remaining three categories of the IAT in blue font. This manipulation should produce an unambiguous salience asymmetry such that when the flower category is in red it should be more perceptually salient than the insect category; likewise, when the insect category is in red it should be more salient than the flower category. To simplify description of IAT tasks in describing procedures, we identify each of the IAT's two combined tasks by naming two categories that are assigned to the same response. Thus the flower+pleasant (equally, the insect+unpleasant) task was performed with the categories flower and pleasant assigned to one response and the categories insect and unpleasant to the other response.
Subjects for Experiment 1 were 30 University of Washington undergraduate students, half assigned to the flower-salient condition (i.e., flower items in red) and half to the insect-salient condition (insect items in red). The stimulus items for all categories were a subset of those used in the original GM&S (Experiment 1) flower-insect IAT. Three measures of salience asymmetry were used in xperiment 1, administered after all other procedures. These salience asymmetry measures assessed natural salience asymmetries of the flower-insect and pleasant-unpleasant category contrasts, rather than testing salience asymmetries due to use of red font (which needed no testing to confirm). To save space, we omit presentation of the details of these three measures (see Footnote 3).
If, as assumed by R&W (p. 140) unpleasant items are more salient than pleasant items, the straightforward prediction of the salience asymmetry hypothesis is that Experiment 1 should reveal (a) faster performance for insect+unpleasant in the insect-salient condition and (b) faster performance for flower+unpleasant in the flower-salient condition. (I.e., if unpleasant is more salient than pleasant, then the conditions mentioned as expected to have faster performance are those in which the two more salient categories are assigned to the same response.) September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -12-The data were analyzed by computing differences between the two combined tasks such that higher values indicated faster performance for insect+unpleasant than for insect+pleasant.
In terms of the salience asymmetry hypothesis, this difference was expected to be numerically higher for the insect-salient condition than for the flower-salient condition. The observed mean differences were 384 ms for the insect-salient condition and 440 ms for the flower-salient condition. Although these two values were not significantly different, the direction of their difference was actually opposite to that predicted by the salience-asymmetry hypothesis, t(28) = -0.69, p = .49.
A related finding was recently reported by Mierke and Klauer (2003, Experiment 1a ). Mierke and Klauer employed an IAT with geometric forms and the two contrasts, red-blue and small-large. All red objects were small and all blue objects were large. This contingency between color and size of stimulus objects (i.e., shared features) led to an IAT effect of faster performance with red+small than with blue+small. When the contingency was reversed for another group of subjects -that is, when all blue objects were small and red objects largethe IAT effect was reversed even though any salience asymmetries between red and blue and between small and large objects should have remained constant. Mierke and Klauer's finding was entirely consistent with a nominal feature interpretation. measures (results from which are tangential to present purposes and are not described here).
As in Experiment 1, the three salience asymmetry measures were administered after all other September 5, 2004 Comment on Salience Asymmetry Account of the IAT -14-procedures.
Results confirmed the nominal-feature expectation that performance on the gender selfconcept IAT would be sharply different for male and female subjects. The IAT measure was scored so that numerically higher scores indicated faster performance for self+female than self+male. For the D measure (Greenwald et al., 2003) It is apparent that our conclusions differ noticeably from those of R&W. One might respond to this difference of opinion by conducting studies to identify possible crucial differences between procedures of R&W's studies and those used in the present two experiments.
However, the goal of identifying such procedures is of minor importance in comparison with the value of conducting further research that more directly assesses the construct validity of the nominal-feature and salience asymmetry interpretations of the IAT.
